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ONLINE BANDWIDTH AUCTIONS 
FOR EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF 
BANDWIDTH 
Y. P. Que and D. Platt 
University of Wollongong 
Wollongong, NSW, 2522, Australia 
Abstract - This paper describes an on-line auction 
process for dynamic bandwidth allocation in 
communication networks. The auction is intended 
to be repeated at short (perhaps ten minute) 
intervals. The outcome of the auction gives both the 
bandwidth allocation, and the price to he paid for 
it. The network is assumed to be MPLS capable, 
and two variations are provided, one in which a 
single LSP is available between each 
sourceldestination pair, and another in which 
multiple LSPs are available. We show that the 
present algorithms are scalable up to about 150 
nodes. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Network providers sell bandwidth to lSPs or 
large companies between defined points within 
their network. When the demand for bandwidth 
is less than what is available, the ISPs simply 
pay the standard price. However, when the 
bandwidth demand is greater than what is 
available, the problem of bandwidth allocation 
arises. This problem, in one form or another, has 
been known for a number of years. 
The attraction of using a pricing mechanism has 
been recognized by a number of researchers. In 
reference [ I ] ,  the authors introduce a pricing 
scheme which rewards users who take less 
bandwidth than what has been allocated to their 
access pipe. In [2], the authors use a game 
theoretic approach to the allocation of bandwidth 
for elastic services in high-speed networks. 
A system of dynamic bandwidth allocation is 
introduced in [3], however, the paper does not 
address the issue of the allocation of bandwidth 
when the users require more bandwidth than is 
available. Reference [4] does not actually price 
the bandwidth, however it does address the issue 
of dynamic bandwidth allocation. 
Takahashi and Tanaka [S, 61 are the closest to an 
on-line dynamic bandwidth allocation using an 
auction mechanism. However, their method 
appears to be overly computationally intensive, 
and they offer results only for an auction over a 
single link 
What we present here is a bandwidth allocation 
scheme, which uses the actual rates paid for each 
route. We will offer results over networks up to 
hundreds of nodes. An ISP, which is prepared to 
pay more for a block of bandwidth, will get that 
bandwidth. The network provider will get the 
maximum income available from selling the 
resources. 
In a public auction, the participants make their 
bids for an item, and they are also able to see 
what others are willing to pay for the same item. 
It is the intention of this paper to offer a similar 
method. The auction would be carried out 
automatically, and would be repeated at short 
intervals, say every ten minutes. After the 
auction has been completed, the bidders are 
guaranteed the bandwidth they are awarded, at 
the finishing price of the auction over the 
following ten minutes. We suggest that this is a 
short enough period for bandwidth demand to be 
tracked closely. They are also committed to 
paying for that bandwidth at  the price which 
finished the auction. 
2. MODEL OF SIMPLE AUCTION 
Let us suppose that we are to auction the 
bandwidth across a single link. The total 
bandwidth available is fixed, but the bidders 
(ISPs) together ask for more than this. The 
auction would proceed with the auctioneer 
suggesting a price, and each bidder stating how 
much bandwidth they are willing to buy at that 
price. Presumably, as the price increases, the 
amount of bandwidth that each bidder will buy, 
must decrease. Thus, as the auction proceeds, the 
price increases, and the total amount of 
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bandwidth required decreases. Eventually, it will 
decrease to an amount just equal to the available 
bandwidth, and the auction stops at that point. 
Every bidder is awarded the amount of 
bandwidth for which they bid, at the final price. 
As it has been described above, the auction is an 
iterated process, but it could be condensed to a 
single step if the bidders entered a graph of the 
bandwidth they would buy at the price they 
would pay. Figure 1 shows such a graph. 
bandwidth 
price 
Figure 1. Bandwidth vs Price for One Bidder 
The graph must have a zero or negative slope at 
all points. Other bidders would have similar 
graphs, and we show in Figure 2 the graphs for 
three bidders. The auction process reaches the 
point “A” on the graph, where the bandwidths all 
add to exactly equal the available bandwidth. 
bandw’ th hot. 
final price 
Figure 2. Auction for a Single Link 
This requires each bidder to disclose, at least to 
the auctioneer, the bandwidth it would have bid 
for prices higher than the finishing price (ruling 
price). The auctioneer would only report to the 
bidders the finishing price, and the bandwidth 
they have been allocated. There is an issue 
around the confidentiality of each bidder’s graph. 
It may be that the bidders are content to simply 
learn their own result, or they may prefer that the 
bandwidth allocated to all bidders be made 
known to them all. The first option would make 
collusion among the ISPs difficult or impossible. 
The second option would allow them to check 
that all were treated equally. 
2.1 MPLS Enabled Network 
We will deal with an IP network, enabled for 
MPLS. Each ISP will require bandwidth between 
a number of nodes within the network. 
Congestion in the network must be controlled by 
the use of appropriate label switched paths 
(LSPs), and we will consider two ways of doing 
this in this paper. The first method consists in 
establishing a single LSP between every 
sourceidestination (sid) pair of nodes. If parts of 
the network become congested, we can ease the 
congestion by setting up a different LSP for 
selected sid pairs. We leave it to other functions 
of network management to achieve this. For this 
paper, it means that there is only one LSP 
between sid pairs, and therefore only one LSP to 
be the subject of an auction. Of course, the 
auction of one LSP affects the bandwidth 
available to other LSPs. 
Another method to deal with congestion in parts 
of a network is to allocate several LSPs 
permanently to each sid pair. Then a LSP which 
passes through a congested part of the network is 
likely to receive relatively little of the total 
bandwidth allocated to the sid pair. Most of the 
bandwidth would go to the LSPs which do not 
pass through heavily congested areas. This 
method makes the management of LSPs less of a 
problem, but increases the complexity of the 
auction algorithm. 
2.2 Method I -Single LSP 
An algorithm must take as its inputs the topology 
of the network, the available bandwidth in each 
link, and the bids of each ISP for each sid pair. 
Each bid must be of the form shown in Figure I ,  
that is, non-increasing, and touching each axis. 
The first step is to aggregate all the bids from the 
ISPs for each LSP, as shown in the example of 
Figure 2. This gives us a combined bid for the 
LSP concemed. 
These combined bids must ‘then compete with 
the bids for other LSPs for the bandwidth in the 
links they use. The next step is lo look at each 
link individually, and combine the bids of all 
LSPs using that link. We then find the ruling 
price for each link, in the same way as is 
illustrated in Figure 2. The algorithm proceeds as 
below. 
1. For each LSP, aggregate bandwidth fiom all 
bids. This will produce a curve such as the one in 
Figure 2.  Create a list of all LSPs available for 
bidding. 
2.  Aggregate the bandwidth for each link, from 
the curves for each LSP using the link (similar to 
Figure 2). Find the ruling price for each link. 
This is the price where the aggregate curve for 
the link crosses the available bandwidth in that 
link. 
3. Select the link with the highest ruling price. 
4. Set this price for all LSPs using this link, and 
for all ISP bids for these LSPs. Allocate the 
corresponding bandwidth to these LSPs and 
ISPS. 
5. Reduce the available bandwidth on all links 
used by these LSPs by the amounts determined 
in step 4, above, and remove these LSPs from 
the list. 
6. If all LSPs have been removed from the list, 
stop. Otherwise, return to step 2.  
2.3 Method 2 - Multiple LSPs 
When multiple LSPs are used, the algorithm is 
more complicated. It turns out to he easier if we 
approach the problem starting from the highest 
prices, and work down, until all possible links 
are fully utilized. We also allocate the bandwidth 
to each LSP in such a way that the bandwidth 
still left available is the same in each of those 
LSPs. This mechanism ensures that traffic is 
directed away from those parts of the network 
where the traffic would be heaviest. 
3 Test Procedures 
A series of networks was generated, in software, 
using a random network generator. The multi- 
LSP system was run with three parallel paths. In 
order to give the multi-LSP system a chance to 
show its potential, the average number of links 
connecting each node was about five. The 
bandwidth of each link was set at I O  Gbps. LSPs 
were generated using Dijkstra’s algorithm. As far 
as possible, the LSPs between a sid pair were 
constrained not to use the same links. The 
collective action of the ISPs was simulated by 
producing a bandwidthiprice curve for each sid 
pair. This would represent the total handwidth 
from all the lSPs at each price. That is, an 
aggregate curve is used for each sid pair. The 
tests were carried out for both algorithms, and 
for varying numbers of nodes, N. The complete 
test of network generation and auction algorithm 
was run five times for each value of N. 
Two different scenarios were tested, neither of 
which could be satisfied by simply allocating the 
floor price. In one scenario, the demand was high 
for all sid pairs, but uniform. In the other, the 
demand for 30% of the sid pairs was 
significantly higher than for the rest. 
To compare the effectiveness of each method, 
the total amount of revenue accepted was 
computed for similar network situations. 
The average run time of the algorithm was 
recorded. 
4 Results 
Figures 3 and 4 show the ruling prices at the end 
of the auction process for a network with 20 
nodes, using the single LSP system. The sid pairs 
are graphed in the order in which the ruling 
prices were determined, which is why the prices 
decrease uniformly. In the case of the bids being 
even, shown in Figure 3, the bulk of the prices 
are close to the highest price. The last few sid 
pairs determined did not need to go through the 
auction process, and the floor price was used. On 
the other hand, Figure 4 shows the results for 
uneven bids, and the first prices determined are 
considerably above the prices achieved for the 
bulk of s/d pairs. These results are as one would 
expect, and the result is similar for the multiple 
Figure 3. Ruling price for even bids, single LSP 
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Figure 5 shows the revenue generated by both 
systems on different sized networks. At all points 
except N=10, the single LSP system generates 
more income. This is perhaps a surprising result, 
since the multi-LSP system seems to offer 
significantly more flexibility. When the bidding 
pattem was uneven, it would be the most likely 
that the multi-LSP system would have the best 
chance of producing the highest revenue. The 
results, shown in Figure 6, do not support this for 
This can be explained by the average number of 
links used in the LSPs when parallel paths have 
The single LSP always uses the least number of 
links. Mostly, parallel paths need more links, so 
the multi-LSP system fills up the network 
capacity more quickly as the auction progresses. 
The single LSP system, being simpler, would be 
expected to take less time to execute. The 
comparison is shown in Figure 8, in both cases, 
the program being run on a 2.7 GHz Pentium 4 
processor. The graph for the single LSP case is 
extended beyond a 50 node network in Figure 9, 
which shows that for N = 316, the average 
execution time increases to 3x10' seconds, or 
500 minutes. When N = 150, the execution time 
is about ten minutes. 
633 
Figure 8. Execution times 
5 Comments and Conclusions 
This paper has proposed a novel system to 
distribute bandwidth in a communications 
network among organizations such as lSPs who 
then on-sell it. The mechanism is based on the 
traditional idea of an auction. We believe that it 
offers the hest possible bandwidth allocation in 
the sense that the network provider receives the 
best possible price for their resources, and 
bandwidth is allocated to the bidders on the basis 
of the money they are prepared to pay for it. 
Two methods, involving a single LSP between 
two points, and multiple LSPs were investigated. 
The single LSP system performed somewhat 
better than the multi-LSP method on several 
measures, not least of which was program 
execution time. 
If bandwidth is auctioned between all pairs of 
nodes, the execution time for the single LSP 
system takes about ten minutes when the 
network has 150 nodes. If this is to be used as a 
real time system, this is about as far as the 
present system can be taken. For networks up to 
this size, this is a system which is responsive to 
commercial reality, and guarantees the highest 
revenue to the network provider. 
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